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REFLECTIONS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY 
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Abstract 
The intellectual role still has a powerful calling because the sacred fire of mankind has 
not been vanished: the action of discussing problematic issues. In fact, there is a 
minimum of cognitive grade, included in the most degraded analysis.  
This  particular  wandering  of  the  spirit,  or  the  exercise  of  intellect,  may be  defined  as  
every process which can be used to record a human experience. The best metaphor to 
characterize it could be a travel. Even there is no a spatial movement from a place to 
another, but there is an imaginary movement, in which the wiser, without moving of this 
place, constructs a space from a present situation. He travels in a land imagined by the 
concepts, the abstractions which make him transcend his specific conditions (Ortiz 
“Taquigrafiando lo social”) (Taking the social in shorthand).  
This present article will be used as a pretext to think some of the paradoxes that show 
the intellectual task. We will expose below about the partial understanding of the 
cognizing subject and the social origin of cognition; then we will make some 
considerations with respect to the history and social production of the intellect; and, 
finally, we will refer to the language as a constructor of reality.  
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1. Searching for knowledge 
 
The search for knowledge that makes every intellectual awake implies certain 
contradictions. As Bauman (2007) remarks, it is often dealt with a failed effort to 
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comprehend, i.e.: the failed understanding. But the author considers that the fact occurs 
neither  as  a  reason  of  the  complexity  of  universe  nor  its  notorious  amenability  to  
contradictory interpretations. He only highlights the partiality of intellect itself. 
Consequently, the intellectual sets about its work loaded with its own past: capacity to 
discover. And it is noticed that he is limited to perceive-record the human experience. 
In  “La busca de Averroes” (The Averroes’ Search), Bauman (2007) explains that 
Borges makes reference to an effort to comprehend which has been defeated. And, thus, 
he reveals that any intellect, however powerful, bears “partiality” (p. 217). There is an 
important contradiction here: thank to its past, the intellect is able to see; because of it, it 
is bound to remain partially blind. And here is the concept of past that must be 
understood as synonym of history. The term “past” states that the cognizing subject is a 
product of the “social fabric” where has been constructed as a member of a specific 
society. In order to provide more consistence to what was mentioned above, we have to 
review the fictional narrative. 
The Averroes short story arises specifically the case of a man who had proposed a goal 
that was not prohibited to others, but it was forbidden to him solely. Although he was a 
scholar- Bauman (2007) insists- he was limited to discover. The problem is, according 
to the author, that the tradition which constituted his intellect offered him no object to 
which to refer the meaning of an alien cultural product.  In his labour of translating an 
Aristotle’s text, hard he tried to understand what the two strange words used by the 
Greek philosopher mean: tragedy and comedy. But the meaning of these terms was 
unfamiliar for the translator enclosed in the Islam. The Borges’ story simply deals with 
a valid judgment for any time of the history. 
For  Ibn  Rusd,  alias  Averroes,  the  Hispano  Arabic  physician  and  one  of  the  most  
important  philosophers  of  the  Middle  Age,  the  things  were  of  the  following  way:  
“Aristú  (Aristotle)  gives  the  name of  the  tragedy to  panegyrics  and  that  of  comedy to  
satires and anathemas. Admirable tragedies and comedies abound in the pages of the 
Koran and in the mohalacas of the sanctuary”. (Borges, 1989, p. 587). When we know 
that panegyrics are statements or speeches in praise of someone; satires, poetic 
compositions which aim is to expose and criticize people’s stupidity or vices; and 
anathemas, death penalties to people or things caused by a curse (DRAE, 2015). 
According to Bauman (2007), the Borges’ message intends to explain that the meaning 
is accessible only when the subject may establish a bridge with the experience. Thus the 
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meanings – the author underlines- support a double bond: imposed by both the text and 
the author. 
In spite of his knowledge, Averroes did not understand the concepts because the Islam 
did not know the theatre. And the wiser became a prisoner for having made of certain 
fabric. It means: the Islamic tradition of Averroes’ intellect did not offer any object to 
which refers to the meaning of a strange cultural product: the terms “tragedy” and 
“comedy”. Bauman (2007) finishes as follows: “Words, when we comprehend them, tell 
us how to go ahead. But Averroes had nowhere to go” (p. 218). 
There is no understanding without experience to which the object may be referred. 
(Bauman, 2007; Marro y Dellamea, 1993). In turn, the different experiences also offer 
different meanings. Moreover, this process of redefinition or production of sense 
appears determined by the specific society where the human being has been socialized. 
Thus, Žižek (2004) affirms that: “There is no perspective which has not been modelled 
by a specific historical horizon of ‘previous knowledge’”. (p. 29) 
The short story named “Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote” (Pierre Menard, author of 
the Quixote) constitutes another example of thinking exposed here. Now, we should 
consider the substantial aspect of this Borges’ creation. Bauman (2007) explains that the 
character Pierre Menard writes one by one the text “Don Quijote de la Mancha” (Don 
Quixote of la Mancha). But as he wrote it in other century and place, the meaning is 
different. Again the social and historical dependence which has each intellectual product 
has been highlighted; since the social conditions amalgamate it in the space and time 
coordinates in which it was conceived. (Bauman, 2007; Heller, 1994) 
According to Borges (1989), Menard had decided to produce a few pages of Don 
Quixote, which would coincide, “word by word and line by line” with those of Miguel 
de Cervantes (p.  446). The performed task – Bauman says (2007) - represented a great 
challenge: to continue being Menard and to reach the Quixote written by Cervantes in 
1602, but through Menard’s experience, Symbolist of Nimes who lived since 1918. To 
such an extent, the author remarks that it was the only thing that he might have done and 
finally he did. “The second text was product of Menard, made by means of Menard’s 
experience” (p. 219). In the facts there were two different texts separated for more than 
three centuries.  
The evidence is visible. The Menard’s Quixote shows neither “band of gypsies, 
conquerors, mystic people”, nor the figure of the King “Phillip II”, nor the “auto-da-fé” 
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(Bauman, 2007, p. 219). As the author said, all these “masks” that Cervantes would not 
have discarded by the simple reason that they had been placed in other time, a long time 
after the Spanish writer’s death. The sociologist explains that the old phrases have been 
given new meaning by the sheer act of their being seized by a new philosophy.  
The Menard’s story is a product of the imagination of the great Argentine writer -
Bauman noted (2007)- but it is not the product of the mentioned problem, which shows 
a second subject matter in the search of knowledge: “the endemic fluidity of meaning”, 
which is proper and exclusive to specific socio-historical realities (p. 221). The meaning 
is a part of the reader’s world so it is considered as significant only inside this world. 
Furthermore, meaning keeps changing together with the reader’s social background 
since this latter is not less free than the author to establish the sense. However, it has 
only the capacity to comprehend everything. This comprehension implies its intrinsic 
variability of the possible meanings and its interpretations. The author specifies that the 
subject is only capable of comprehending everything that is permitted by its knowledge; 
and it results from the specific social conditions in which the actor was conceived; or, 
from a reading in semiologic key, from the codes and subcodes (language and culture) 
which reach him (Eco, 1987). 
We have to insist on this point of view: the Pierre Menard’s limitations go to underline 
unequivocally the social nature of the whole comprehension. So the individual’s full 
understanding may not miss something for which the possibility has no conscience. As 
for any intellectual, the search of knowledge for Averroes will continue being more than 
evasive and cunning. The ignorance veils persist in concealing “the social” presence. 
 
2. How do we know?  
 
The world which is displayed in front of the exercise of the intellectual role is a world 
of culture because, from the beginning, the world of everyday life is considered as an 
universe of meaningful for individuals, i.e., a sense texture that they will have to 
interpret to guide and move around the world. Unlike what happens with the realm of 
nature, Schutz (1974a) explains that such texture is originated in and has been instituted 
by human actions, their contemporaries’ and predecessors’.  
To  come  to  the  point  about  the  subject  matter,  we  have  to  make  an  analogy.  In  the  
“Alegoría de la caverna” (Cavern Allegory), Plato (1998) refers that most part of the 
“Del otro lado del espejo” (From the other side of the mirror). 
Reflections about knowledge and society 
 
ORIENTACIÓN Y SOCIEDAD N° 15 | enero-diciembre 2015| 5 
 
reality that we know seems to lead to a reality which is understood by the shadow of the 
artificial objects. In the same way, men enchained to the rhetorical figure, depend on the 
light projection in order to construct images about reality for which they may not accede 
directly,  but they have to limit  to see the “shadows” of the true facts.  Thus,  the social  
patterns and samples are equal to the ideas and, in such sense, permanent and 
immutable, plenty immaterial; while the acts imitate the types and they are not confused 
with them. The human being is taught how to define the environment and typical 
constructions have to be formed in accordance with the system of relevances accepted 
from the anonymous unified point of view of the in-group. This highlights the social 
and contextual character of knowledge which appears in everyday situations. 
Regarding to Schutz (1974a), we have to start establishing that the primary knowledge 
is the total sum of all knowledge known about a social world. In other words: a group of 
mottos, morals, little stones of proverbial wisdom, values and beliefs, myths, etc. And 
this knowledge is transmitted to the human being through a primary socialization 
process (family) and a secondary socialization process (school, mass media, etc.) The 
individuals are taught how to define the typical features of the natural aspect of the 
world prevailing in the in-group as the unquestioned but always questionable sum total 
of things taken for granted until further notice; as well as how typical constructions have 
to be formed in accordance with the system of relevances prevailing in the linguistic in-
group which found the named thing significant enough to provide a separate term for it.  
However, Schutz (1974a) states that knowledge not only has a social origin but it is 
socially distributed. Thus, different individuals and types of individuals have it in 
different grades. The human being does not know everything what other people know, 
and vice versa, and the distribution finishes with very complex and esoteric systems of 
aptitude. So, knowledge distinguishes among the following categories: the layman, the 
well-informed man, and the specialist. There is an important social division of labour of 
epistemological character. And this division is settled on a social distribution of 
knowledge  that  structures  the  society  and  the  social  roles  which  perform  their  actors.  
The author highlights the fact that is translated into a deep separation and inequality in 
the  whole  society.  Experts  form  one  of  the  institutional  causes  of  change  of  power  
concentration. 
With respect to the common-sense thinking in their everyday life, men know these 
different dimensions of the social world where they live. Schutz (1974a) points out that 
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the stock of actual knowledge at hand differs from individual to individual, and 
common-sense thinking takes this fact into account. Not only “what” an individual 
knows differs  from what  his  neighbour  knows,  but  also  “how” both  know the  “same”  
facts. It happens because knowledge has manifold degrees of clarity, distinctness, 
precision  and  familiarity.  If  we  take  as  an  example  James’  well  known  distinction  
(1994) between “knowledge of acquaintance” and “knowledge-about” – the author 
explains – that it is obvious that many things are known to an individual just in the 
dumb way of mere acquaintance, whereas “his neighbour” knows “about” what makes 
them what they are, and vice versa. Someone may be an “expert” in a small field and 
“layman” in many others. Likewise, it is necessary that this knowledge is not only 
fragmentary, since it is limited to certain areas of this world; also it is often 
contradictory in itself and it has all degrees of clarity and distinction, from the full 
understanding or “knowledge about”, passing by the “knowledge of acquaintance” or 
mere familiarity, to the blind belief in assumed things (pp. 97-99). 
We will insist of this point: knowledge and society are deeply linked. Knowledge, both 
special and general, comes from a matrix of action and experiences shared and 
conditioned by others. Every interpretation of the world of the everyday life is based on 
a stock of past experiences of it, those inherent to the individuals and those which have 
been transmitted by their parents or teachers that function as scheme of reference as 
knowledge at hand. Although individuals define the world from their own perspective; 
they are social human beings, rooted in an intersubjective reality. 
Different from the nature world that, as the Natural Science specialist studies, does not 
“mean” anything for the molecules, atoms and electrons, Schutz (1974a) underlines that 
the observation field of social reality has a specific meaning and a structure of 
relevances  for  the  human beings  who live,  act  and  think  about  it.  Through a  series  of  
common sense construction, they have made selections and previous interpretations of 
this world that experiment as the reality of their everyday lives.  
Due to this instance, it is proper to make some remarks with respect to the intellect role. 
Paraphrasing Schutz (1974a), the thought objects that the intellectual constructs to grasp 
the social reality have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the 
common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within their social world. The 
construction  of  social  science  consists  of  a  construction  of  the  constructions  made  by  
those who act in the social life (Bourdieu, 1991). Likewise, the interest selective 
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function organizes the world in strata from more to less meaningful. The same observed 
behaviour (for example, an initiation ceremony as we have seen in films) may have for 
the  social  actors  a  very  different  meaning.  The  only  interesting  thing  for  a  Social  
Science  specialist  is  to  know  how  to  deal  with  a  rite  of  passage,  a  war  dance  or  
something similar. The social reality has elements of beliefs and convictions that are 
true because they are defined by the participants, and they escape from sensorial 
observation. To such extent, the author highlights that knowledge, both special and 
general, is made of a matrix of action and experience shared and conditioned by others.  
Finally, a remark that we have already said but we need to remember: society and 
search of knowledge, or task typical of the intellectual role, take part two categories 
deeply linked. But in fact, there is another aspect that goes through this linking and we 
may not avoid: history. In such sense, Durkheim (2002) considers that society has an 
“immemorial” origin or, more exactly, constitutes a base that is the memory of the last 
generations. Although the author explains that it deals with a particular past whereas it 
may not be seen by us.  And when we begin to think in a conscious way of our reality, 
we have already been constructed by it in its own way.  
  
3. The contemporary cage 
 
To think that the Faustian man may know everything through their mind represents 
other of the paradoxes of the intellectual role. To believe that the Social Sciences are 
nomothetic and may create universal and no historical laws is not more than example of 
a  false  solution.  In  “Políticas de la posmodernidad” (The Postmodern Political 
Conditions), Heller (1994) explains that the individual is captive in a contemporary 
prison. Definitely, modernity has given samples of illusory escapes. So we have to learn 
to live with the contradiction. 
The modern man is a being who may transform the nature according to his needs and 
reason. However, even it would seem that he may know everything by means of using 
with his understanding; he will be subject to history. All knowledge will be conditioned 
by history. Thus, we consider that the infinite capacity of knowing that modernism has 
stated is a fallacy. The intellectual’s attitude in view of his task consists of living with 
the “paradox”, without attempting to overcome it: because human beings may not leave 
their time.  
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Within the Heller’s perspective, there is another relevant point in regards to the task that 
the intellect has: the relation between truth with capital letters and true knowledge. For 
the prestigious Hungarian philosophy seems unlikely to reach the absolute truth. In fact, 
the absolute truth establishes the life in an absolute way and causes a very powerful 
impact on the whole existence. But it depends on the particular and subjective belief of 
each person. Instead, the true knowledge is relative and objective since it may be asked 
for discussion. What I have said implies to admit the confrontation. If there is a Social 
Science, some empirical acknowledgement, some criteria of truth must validate the 
search of knowledge. Likewise, if there are several interpretations, it will be rich and 
useful (Heller, 1994). 
Diversity is rich as long as it avoids relativism (infinite interpretations) and the accurate 
positivism (an interpretation). But if we say that interpretation is valuable, it will not 
mean that any interpretation is valid. There are interpretations which are not supported. 
In any case, there is no possibility of giving definitions about concepts totally finished, 
therefore they will be given according to a specific point of view.  
 In order to follow a possible path to bring the cognoscible object closer, Heller (1994) 
appeals to the metaphor of the “nucleus” and the “ring” to highlight two levels of the 
true knowledge and, this way, to summarize what it means to theorize about social 
science (pp. 64-65). Thus, the nucleus is represented by a group of empirical data with 
which we are going to agree. For example, a document is contrastable, and in general it 
does not generate important discussions. If there was no nucleus, Social Science would 
lose solidity. Instead, the named ring gives testimony of the researchers’ perspective. Its 
issue consists of the different perspectives about the mentioned nucleus. Likewise, it is 
the place of creativity and interpretation. For the Lukács’ disciple, it is the richest space 
that has the social study. To such an extent, the equation that it can be seen immediately 
is the following: if there was some nucleus, it would be boring but true. But if the 
relation was inverse, i.e., if there was an excess of ring, we would fall into the rhetoric. 
Therefore, knowledge would not be sustainable. 
The author proposes a balanced combination between creativity and solidity. It means 
that the theoretical critic has to be able to capture the good interpretations. So the pure 
ring implies a big risk: that Social Science will be become literature or ideology. Thus, 
it is necessary to look for equilibrium between nucleus and ring. This sensitive 
equilibrium is achieved through phronesis. This ethic virtue that, for Aristotle, consists 
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of being prudent, avoiding the extremes and pursuing the middle point. In this case, the 
true knowledge would be work of prudence and the researcher’s ethics. A concrete 
expression of this art would be, for example, not to treat to the interviewers as means. 
All that is in relation with one of the Kantian imperative that says: People must not be 
considered as means but as ends in themselves. 
The intellectual must leave apart the existence from an Archimedes-based point which 
questions the reality. It implies that it will not be supported in a secure starting point 
which permits to avoid the relativity of interpretations and create a definitely true and 
closed knowledge from discussion, as a dogma. It would not be more than a false exit to 
the paradox since it is impossible to give complete definitions. From a closer point of 
view, Gadamer (1998) explains that any interpretation comes from a spiral and, thus, it 
is not possible to reach a concluding interpretation because there are prejudices. And 
there is an insurmountable distance between the individuals and their texts which is fed 
from values and history.  
Before leaving this paragraph to reflect about other two aspects of the intellectual role, 
it is proper to have into account a warning made by Giddens (1987) in relation with the 
hermeneutics of the social science. The famous sociologist starts with the idea that 
every generalized theoretical scheme, within the Natural or Social Science fields, is to a 
certain measure “a way of living in itself”, whose concepts must be controlled, as a 
practical work, causing particular types of descriptions. “That it is already a 
hermeneutic task, it is demonstrated clearly in the ‘new philosophy of science’ by Kuhn 
and others” (p. 165). Nevertheless, the author supports that the concepts of the social 
field obey to what he names a “double hermeneutics”.  
This double hermeneutics is very complex, because its connection is not merely 
unambiguous […]; there is a continuous ‘movement’ of the concepts created in sociology, 
through which individuals appropriate of them for the analysis of whose behaviour were 
originally created, and therefore they tends to become integral features of this behaviour 
modifying potentially, thus, their original use within the technical vocabulary of Social 
Science (pp. 165-166). 
 
Interpretation  is  a  spiral  game  that  never  dies.  However,  it  is  possible  that  the  
intellectuals may create a true knowledge in the field of Social Science. And in the 
dialectic framework, it is also possible that the intellectual may work hard searching for 
the truth. It permits the acknowledgement of the social studies as a science. Although 
they are very different to the formal sciences due to its central nucleus is the meaning. 
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And because, the intellectual role in this field refers to reconstruct, recreate and create. 
Otherwise, we remember that proposition of Wittgenstein (2003) when mentions that if 
a concept depends on a pattern of living, so it is important to wait a certain lack of 
definition of it.  
 
4. The veils of the Lebenswelt   
 
The first attribute of a society consists of its capacity of self-construction and projection 
over the years; and after the construction of other social facts. Among the different 
theoretical forms that deal with the theme, Luhmann (1968) explains that the societies 
may be reproduced themselves in their condition of autopoietic social systems. Berger 
and Luckmann (1979) maintain a similar sense when they support that the reality is 
socially constructed. Other aspects are fed with other authors’ contributions, among 
them we may mention to Schutz (1974b), Berger and Luckmann (1979), Castoriadis 
(1993), Habermas (1984), Giddens (2007), Labourdette (2003, 2011), etcetera. All these 
authors have given, in their diversities, similar supports about the role of society to 
produce several social constructions.  
 People create, through the subjective sense that is attributed to their different everyday 
actions, a reality. But this same reality is imposed simultaneously and they are 
transformed in members of this world (Labourdette, 2003, 2011). As Berger mentions 
(1971):   “In  other  words,  the  world  created  by  the  man  reaches  the  character  of  
objective reality” (p. 21). However, we have to remark that the statement which 
explains  as  the  human being  is  formed by  self,  does  not  mean in  any  way to  adopt  a  
species of “Promethean vision” of the solitary individual. Likewise, the human being as 
a self-producing being is always and necessarily a “social institution” (pp. 71-72). 
Society is a human product and anything more than a human product, but it reacts in a 
permanent way on its producer. It is about a historical construction formed by objective 
and subjective aspects, which interact in a dialectic and mutual movement (Berger, 
1971). Thus, Berger and Luckmann (1979) affirm that: “Both by its genesis (the social 
order is a result of the past human activity), and by its existence in any period of time 
(the social order only exists meanwhile the human activity continues producing it), it is 
a human product” (p. 73). 
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Regarding this aspect of the reality, the society evidently has an “objective facticity”. 
And society, also evidently, is constructed by an activity that expresses a “subjective 
meaning”. For Berger and Luckmann (1979) it is precisely the dual character of society 
in terms of objective facticity and subjective meaning that makes it “reality sui generis”.  
The subjective meanings become objective facticities; moreover: the human activity 
(Handeln) produces a world of things (choses). The adequate understanding of the 
“reality sui generis” of the society requires an inquiry into the manner in which reality is 
constructed. (p. 35)  
The reality of everyday life is not only filled with objectivations; it is only possible 
because of them. The authors note that we are constantly surrounded by “objects” which 
“proclaim” the subjective intentions of their fellowmen; although they may sometimes 
have difficulty being quite sure just what it is that a particular object is “proclaiming”, 
especially if it was produced by men whom they have not known well or at all in face-
to-face situations. The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily 
by “linguistic signification” (pp. 53-55). Since everyday life is, above all, life with and 
by means of the language we share with our fellowmen.  
Berger and Luckmann (1979) support that a social world at all, in the sense of a 
comprehensive and given reality confronting the individual in a manner analogous to 
the reality of the natural world. For that matter, they conclude: “as” an objective world, 
and only this way, can the social formations be transmitted to a new generation. 
Through the process by which the externalized products of human activity attain the 
character of objectivity is objectivation. And despite the objectivity that marks the 
social world in human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological “status” 
apart from the human activity that produced it. It is important to highlight the paradox 
that man is capable of producing a world that he then experiences as something other 
than a human production will concern us.   
Society constitutes a reality both subjective and objective. It means: specific practices 
are produced as a daily interaction with different social actors. After, this same praxis is 
given  by  people  with  a  type  of  objectivation  that  considers  that  there  is  no  problem,  
leaving it secure of eventual questionings. And, finally, the concepts are internalized 
and they form a pattern of culture with a naturally appearance (Berger and Luckmann 
1979; Labourdette, 2003, 2011). 
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This relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and 
remains a “dialectical” one. That is, man, (not in isolation but in his collectivities) and 
his social world interact with each other. And the product acts back upon the producer. 
“Externalization” and “objectivation” are moments of a “continuing dialectical 
process”. “Internalization” is the other moment of this process. Through this, the 
objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization. 
That  is:  the  “apprehension  or  interpretation”  of  an  “objective  event”  as  expressing  
meaning, i.e., as a manifestation of another’s subjective processes which thereby 
becomes “subjectively meaningful” to any individual. In first place, the internalization 
is  the  basis  for  an  “understanding”  of  one’s  fellowmen.  And,  in  second  place,  for  the  
apprehension of the world as a “meaningful and social reality”. In the complex form of 
internalization, not only understand the other’s momentary subjective processes, but 
understand the world in which he lives, and that world becomes ones’ own. Berger and 
Luckmann (1979) point out that we not only live in the same world, but we participate 
in each other’s being. The fact is that every individual is born into an “objective social 
structure” within which he encounters the significant others who are in charge of his 
socialization and, in turn, these significant others are imposed upon him. Their 
definitions that his situation are posited for him as “objective reality” (pp. 164-166).  
According to Berger and Luckmann’s words: “Society is a human product.  Society is 
an  objective  reality.  Man is  a  social  product”  (p.  84).  Each  one  of  this  three  dialectic  
moments of the social reality establish a relevant relation and each one of them 
correspond to a basic characterization of the social world. We summarize: both the 
subject who leads the intellectual role, and the practice itself that looks for discovering 
the object of knowledge, make aware of a social construction that results from the 
process that we are exposing. 
Berger (1971) emphasizes that within the society framework where the individual 
becomes a person, acquires and maintains an identity and carries out different projects 
that form his life. In short: the society is a building company of worlds. In fact, this 
building also occurs through the infinite range of senses that may be exhibited in the 
intellectual production. And by other hand, they reveal the creation of the mentioned 
worlds, also called “life world”. 
The notion of “life world” o Lebenswelt has a famous lineage in the field of philosophy, 
sociology and anthropology especially. This aspect rests in the last Husserl and in his 
“Del otro lado del espejo” (From the other side of the mirror). 
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phenomenological successor Schutz. Both authors mark again and rediscover the social 
and moral value that has the capacities to construct reality, truth, and everyday life in 
human communities.  
The everyday life world constitutes this realm of reality, in which man engages himself 
restlessly, in modalities that are at the same time inevitable and ruled. Schutz and 
Luckmann (1973) understand that:  
is the region of the reality in which man can engage himself and which he can change while 
he operates in it by means of his animate. At the same time, the objectivities and events 
which are already found in this realm (including the acts and results of the actions of other 
men) limit his free possibilities of action. (p. 25). 
 
When we analyze the first constructions of thinking of common sense in the everyday 
life, Schutz and Luckmann (1973) agree to mention that it is not possible to act as if it 
was  “my  private  world”  and  as  if  we  are  allowed  to  miss  that  we  are  in  front  of  
intersubjective cultural world. This fact is supported by the following reasons: it is 
intersubjective because the individual lives within it “as men among other men”; since, 
from the beginning, the “everyday life world” constitutes an universe of meanings for 
the human being, i.e., a texture of sense that must be interpreted and in order to conduct 
and guide it. And the matrix of this texture of senses dwells in the human actions and 
has been established by them, by themselves and by their fellowmen, contemporaries or 
predecessors (p. 41). 
It is important to mention that people create doing, with the subjective sense that is 
given to their actions, a world that simultaneously may be imposed to them and 
transform them in members of this world. The preceding indicates a particular 
interrelation. In fact, there is the subjective weight of the individual supports that social 
actors incorporate to their variety of personal production; but there is also the objective 
weight of this sociological creation that models to their supporters slowly and surely. 
Therefore: reality is a “social construction”. And this reality represents a human 
construction that has raised a grade of objectivity that impels the individual to 
acknowledge as such (Berger, 1971; Labourdette, 1999). 
As we have already mentioned, among the realities produced socially, the intellectual is 
considered as one of them. And, in this dialectic game, also constructs knowledge 
displaying, this way, in its noble job of uncovering. Thus, to construct an object is 
considered as social demonstration in the intellectual field. As Foucault (1992) teaches 
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us: every story is  produced from a particular place; and it  implies to become aware of 
this place and of the modes of production of wisdoms.  
We  have  described  a  part  of  the  intellectual  role:  as  it  is  a  social  construction  of  the  
other social construction (called society), that permits to see a knowledge crossed by the 
social wrap, in which are inserted the thinking and intellectual categories. That person 
who wants to reach the “aletheia” or uncovering of the truth.  
 
5. The man’ dwelling   
 
Every thinker is a prisoner of his own social condition. Therefore, Durkheim (2002) 
explains  that  most  of  our  ideas  and  tendencies  –  as  those  ideas  and  tendencies  of  any  
society with respect to how understand the reality and its different aspects- come from a 
historical and constructed externality which has been imposed. Moreover, the issue is 
founded on that which has been constructed artificially is a product of language: the big 
tool constructor of realities. According to what we have already mentioned, other of the 
paradoxes is revealed to put the intellectual role under analysis.  
The human language is a phenomenon so internalized by the human being that it is not 
taken into account. It is the symbolic expression of a determined society, of the social 
fabric. And as Aristotle teaches, it is the most visible human distinction since it 
represents the leap of the realm of animal to the human.  
The intellectual’s task consists of constructing wisdoms and communicating, it is only 
possible based on the existence of a symbolic language that permits the transmission, 
the first tool of the cultural creation. Thus, the most interesting of the human language is 
that may carry a world without having to transport it. That is, this is an unique wealth: 
the capacity of abstracting and symbolizing.  
The society creates a language, through which is transmitted all the wisdom and the 
doing accumulated, from history, in the culture. And this social production represents 
the marvelous of the social creation, besides of generating the individual and society 
(Labourdette, 2011). Thus, it acquires an essential role in the searching of knowledge 
and,  in  itself,  forms  a  social  fact  of  first  order;  constructed  in  the  course  of  this  long  
“conversation” that is life (Berger, 1971). The word has the property of starting the 
human being the eternal present characteristic of the animal given him or her power for 
the thinking. Without it there would not be any possibility of producing knowledge in 
“Del otro lado del espejo” (From the other side of the mirror). 
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the intellectual field. This is one of the reasons why we are interested in emphasizing 
the importance of language as a constructor of human reality. 
As a symbol system, Berger and Luckmann (1968) indicate that language constructs 
immense buildings of symbolic representations that appear to tower over the reality of 
the everyday life gigantic presences from another world. In the same way, language 
builds up semantic fields and zones of meaning, a great selective accumulation 
determining what will be retained and what will be forgotten of the total experience. In 
a similar sense, Gadamer (1998) teaches us that the word has a collective meaning. 
Since the word that is said to a person, also the word that is granted to ones’ or someone 
says referring to a promise, it is not only referred to the individual word, but also it 
implies a social relationship (p. 16). 
 
In summary: the language makes us capable of symbolizing. And, however, this 
capacity is enclosed in certain limits that the social fabric establishes. Thus, with all his 
knowledge, Averroes does not achieve to understand the concepts of tragedy and 
comedy simply because Islam did not know the theatre. By his part, the character Pierre 
Menard, symbolist of Nimes who lived in 1918, he only reaches out to the Quixote 
through Menard’s experiences, the only possible way.  
The facts show that the individual is a prisoner of a socio-personal or historical wrap. 
Since due to language, that is product of a determined society, the human being is 
transformed into a species of historical chrysalis. Even the human being is unable to 
move the wings towards the infinite like a butterfly. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..... 
 
Nobody may think, discuss problematic issues or construct knowledge if they are lack 
of language. And, paradoxically, this same language is what does not allow us to think, 
discuss problematic issues or construct knowledge when we want to be free of our 
chrysalis. When, as in a Faustian attempt, we want to put our heads out from the other 
side of the mirror. 
